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We are our bodies—but in that very basic notion one also discovers that our bodies have an amazing 
plasticity and polymorphism that is often brought out precisely in our relations with technologies. We 
are bodies in technologies.  
—Don Ihde, Bodies in Technologies  
Keywords: cinematic experience, immersiveness, cinematic self, perspective- taking, OBE  
Introduction 
What we generally suppose in this chapter is that film experience is, from its very 
beginning, thought of as an experience rooted in our brain-body system, aiming to 
externalize our cognitive processes, feelings, emotions, and motor behavior 
(Münsterberg 1916; Freeburg 1918) and that certain modalities of perspective 
taking, switching perspectives, dynamic emotional empathetic behaviour with 
other bodies are part of a general cinematic experience that might be also present 
especially in technically induced or manipulated Out-of-Body Experiences (OBE´s).  
Therefore we propose an explorative journey in the territory of the cinematic 
(bodily) self in relation to (1) Out-of-body experiences and (2) different modes of 
“(inter-) embodied” cinematic experience in relation to perspective taking and 
immersion. This will be persued in a theoretical “bifocal vision” of plastic and 
polymorphic bodies and selves in technologies.  
Therefore we explore the notion of self in OBE experiences in relation to the natural 
medium of the human body that sometime has been iconically related to the 
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cinematic apparatus. We give a short overview on a debate on film rooted in the 
idea that this relatively new form of art is to some extent rooted in a “neurological 
conception of modernity” (Singer 1995) and that its appeal is basically related to 
what Georg Simmel would call an intensification of the nervous stimulation 
resulting from the swift and uninterrupted change of outer and inner stimuli.  
During the first decades of XX century, several physicians start studying movies 
because they guess that something physical is happening to a viewer whose mental 
and bodily faculties are altered cinematographically.  Such a position is basically shared 
by the tradition of French filmology – gathered around the “Revue International de 
Filmologie” –, by people like Erich Feldmann (1953), who quite clearly talked of a 
bilocated mind (cf: Furlanetto et al 2013) during film-watching, describing film 
experience like formed by two ellipses, one related to the real world and the other 
to the fiction with a small area in between intersection enacted by the viewer still 
on his seat in the darkness. Henri Wallon (1953) then linked this discussion to 
viewers’ motor behavior and mirror mechanisms.  
 Finally we will make a first explorative journey into the concept of “Cinematic 
experience as a temporally limited immersive self-loss in the other” or inside –the-other- 
(body) experience a) suspended in its status nascendi b) a flight interrupted when 
the lights are switched on, or c) a morphing that regresses when we “drop out of 
the game”.  
1. Cinematic experience 
According to a consolidate tradition within film studies, film experience challenges 
our spatio-temporal cognition and implies an alteration of viewers’ self and body 
and thus their embodied self, by using film style and editing to trigger in some cases 
something very similar to Out-of-Body-Experiences (OBEs), switching the 
spectator’s viewpoint and her emotional and empathetic identification or better: his 
or her immersivenes into the film’s body.  
With such a term – which has been used both in studies within film phenomenology 
and in those within cinematic subjectivity (Sobchack 1992, 2004; Barker 2009; 
Chateau 2011) – we refer to the layers of resonance represented by the bodies 
depicted on the screen, but also to the gestuality simulated by the complex 
experience with the movie itself, that is to the ability of film techniques of conveying a 
peculiar form of subjectivity, including the immersiveness of the self of the spectator 
in the cinematic experience. Let´s recall editing style that conveys such a form of 
cinematic (inter-) subjectivity as proposed by Walter Murch (2001):  
According to the American film-editor’s Rules of Six an “ideal” editing style conveys 
six criteria at once and in a certain hierarchy of importance: 1) emotional 
entanglement with the emotion of the cinematic moment (“51%”) 2) Advancement 
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of the story (“22%”) 3) Rhythm (“10%”) occuring at the rhythmically right moment 
4) Attentional Eye-Trace (“7%”), acknowledging the audience’s focus of interest at 
each moment 5) Planarity (“6%”) of the screen and 6) the three dimensional 
continuity of actual space (“4%”) where people are in the room and in relation to 
one another.  
Interestingly, one could add the suspension of feeling one´s somatic body as one of the 
self-evident rules of cinematic experience together with the getting emotionally 
entangled within not only the character of the movie but with the whole “body of the film”: 
cinematic experience becomes an outcome of a specific embodied technique (Ihde 
2002,2010). 
ȡ 
If we vary our perspective, we can ask: Could we consider OBE as a cinematic 
experience without a screen in which the proper body image would be projected 
outside? 
Why does perspective matter (Petkova et al 2011)? How do alteration of perspective 
introduce change in the 1st Person Perspective (1PP) realized by a) alienation (OBE) 
or b) appropriation (avatar identification) (see: Ganesh et al 2011) as well as by the 
switch in between 2nd, 1st and 3rd PP in order to better understand (altered) cinematic 
self experience: The egocentric reference frame, our orthodox 1PP might be not as 
clearly as it seems our principal perspective we can assume. Beccio et al (2011) calls 
the First person perspective “egocentric perspective” while imagining another 
opposite perspective of our own would be for her a “disembodied perspective 
taking”, while a second person actually sitting in front of someone would be an 
“embodied perspective taking”. For her, perspective taking needs the presence of 
another person to function plainly.  However, we suppose that by our image-
consiousness (Husserl 2006) we are enabled to take the embodied perspective of 
another embodied person also in his artificial presence on a movie screen (in all its 
degrees of embodiment). If we talk here of perspective taking we have to clearify 
that we can distinguish at least the following basic forms:  
1) Visuospatial perspective taking 2) affective perspective taking 3) kinaesthetic perspective 
taking 4) motivational or volitional perspective taking.  
All four should seen as joint/ coordinated and sometimes segregated as in altered 
self -experience. 
Clearly the doubeling of the somatic /virtual self in autoscopic experiences, in which 
the virtual body or body image is doubled and the attentional self-location between 
the constitutional virtual body image (see: Ihde 2002) and the somatic body schema 
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may switch as in OBE, should be considered different from the orthodox film 
experience, where a moviegoer sits still in a dark movie theater.  
And nonetheless, the viewer’s empathetic relations and social perspective taking 
with the other on the screen, that is from a fixed body position to a virtually mobile 
one, could lead to something similar to the feeling of displacement of one’s own 
body (as in OBE), or transformation of one’s own body (OBT; see Gardner 2013).  
Our proposal is connected to what Don Ihde (2002, 2010) designates as “embodied 
technics” of cinematic experience: our embodied and mediated experience with and 
through contemporary technologies, in our case mainly cinema (a 2D moving 
picture in a dark room experience in which our body is quietly sitting on a chair) 
and derived new forms of cinematic experience and immersiveness (from frontal, 
stereo-sound to sensouround-sound in Apocalypse Now to several screens to being 
immersed in a 3D atmosphere). 
If we start from the position that our self in its dynamic constitution is actually 
mediated by and through our body and the technologies we experience our bodies 
though, we can´t favor a position of media-technologies, imaging, digital-
compuational or virtual reality and film being responsible for just “disembodying 
ourselves”. Neither could we hold a position that our bodies might be reducible to 
machinic bodies in which we can utopically “upload” our minds, but with John 
Ihde we can realistically argue that the somatic human experience of embodied 
technics is actually embodied or re-embodied in new interactive ways and thus our 
self experience is transformed through new somatic externalization and 
reinternalization: we become a cinematic self in its technically instilled and mediated loops 
of intersbjective and empathetic embodiments- disembodiments and reembodiments. 
ȡ 
What if, the lights never turn back on again in the embodied cinema, or if we turn 
them on and we were in another place or in another body? Thereby different degrees 
of self-loss and its different modes of the suspension/alteration of the self in filmic 
(2D, 3D) or virtual reality can be thought of. These ideas are not so far from 
contemporary research by Visch, Tan, and Molenaar (2010) on film immersion (2D, 
3D, VR), and from Don Ihde’s proposals on embodied techniques (2010), where he 
describes the position of the viewer respect to movies and videogames according to 
three different typologies: embodied, disembodied, avatar. These proposed triads 
of cinematic experience help us in understanding the different possible modes of 
the self in altered self-experience and we might include OBEs as a forth mode of the 
body-image in the sense of a doubled self.   
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2. The of Out of Body (OBE) Experience and the general mechanisms of 
perspective and perspective-taking 
2.1 OBE´s 
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OBE is often described as a breakdown of several necessary aspects of bodily self-
consciousness (see: Brugger et al. 1997; Blanke et al. 2002; Aspell et al 2012, Gerner 
fc 2014). Thus Out-of-body experiences challenge and alter our everyday experience 
of the spatial unity of self and body and the identity of self and body, whereby the 
body is given as the most complex multisensory “object” in the world (Aspell et al 
2012).  
Out-of-body experiences are conventionally analyzed as “autoscopic phenomena” 
that- as Bolognini et al (2012) put it- “refer to complex experiences involving the 
illusory reduplication of oneތs own body”. According to Mohr&Blanke (2005) 
autoscopic phenomena (AP) are rare, illusory visual experiences during which the 
subject e.g. has the impression of seeing a second own body in extrapersonal space. 
AP - in their view- consist in “out-of-body experience, autoscopic hallucination, and 
heautoscopy”.  
“The main forms of doubles are the visual own-body reduplications: autoscopic 
hallucination (AH), heautoscopy (HAS), and out-of-body experience (OBE) as well 
This diagram (adopted from: Blanke & Metzinger 2008, 10) shows the dynamics of the 
attentional self-location [SL] or point of view in autoscopic experience: Three cases of 
direction of the attentional point of view in natural cinematic experience without a screen, 
either from the hallucinated body towards the somatic body in Out-of-body experience 
(virtual observer perspective) or from the somatic body towards the hallucinated virtual 
body (somatic 1P perspective) in Autoscopic hallucination or both ways in Heautoscopy 
(switching between somatic 1P perspective and virtual observer perspective).  The 
somatic and the virtual body in these three cases of observer perspectives always face each 
other on the contrary to a “felt presence” from behind (existential feeling perspective of 
autoscopy), another form of autoscopic experience 
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as the rarer forms including polyopic heautoscopy and inner heautoscopy. These 
are referred to here as visual doubles. Other own body reduplications include 
feeling of a presence (sensorimotor doubles), hearing of a presence (auditory 
doubles), and negative heautoscopy (negative doubles).” (Blanke2 et al 2008, 451)  
For Brugger et al (2006) Heautoscopy is the encounter with one’s double (the 
reduplication of a single body and self and thus a breakdown of integrative 
processes that let me identify with my body or my self), in the sense of a multimodal 
illusory reduplication of one’s own body and self. The phenomenon of polyopic 
heautoscopy (a multiplication of body and self) according to Brugger et al (2006) 
“points to the multiple mappings of the body, whose disintegration may give rise 
to the illusory experience of multiple selves.“  
Autoscopic phenomena deal with viewpoint changes, illusionary self-
identification, altered or abnormal self-location(s) and changes in the first- person 
perspective (cf. Blanke 2012). They can be ideopathic, self induced or induced by 
non-invasive technological aid (Blanke & Metzinger 2009) using for instance video 
(Lenggenhager et al 2007), virtual reality (Ehrsson 2007) or robotic devices (Ionta 
2011), inducing changes in the self-location, self-identification or first person 
perspective in healthy subjects; Moreover, recent research has not only described 
phenomenologically these strange doubeling, mirrowing or shadowing 
phenomena of a “disrupted” self (Mishara 2010) but has shown as well that invasive 
manipulation of the brain can even induce a “illusory shadow person” (Arzy et al 
2006) by artificial brain stimulation.  
Phenomenologically OBEs can be characterized by three elements:  
(1) The impression that the self is localized outside one’s body. This can mean a 
feeling of disembodiment or the impression of a virtual body phenomon- e.g. a 
doubeling phenomenon of the body or an extrasomatic attentional self-location. A 
person experiencing an OBE in this sense would be absorbed by the experience of 
an (supplementary) allocentric self, besides the somatic self;  
(2) The experience of seeing the world from an extracorporeal and elevated or even 
lowered first-person perspective, and thus changing and doubling the proper point 
of view: what we would generally describe as a dynamics of points of view and 
perspectives and their perspective switches. This dynamics in autoscopic and 
heteroscopic perspective-taking is of course not at all exclusive to OBEs by asking: 
“Could there be spatial situations in which people spontaneously adopt another’s 
perspective rather than their own, even when not communicating to other person?” 
(Tversky and Hard 2009) 
(3) Experience in OBEs are mostly accompanied with the non-unitary notion of the 
self as doubeling or splitting of one’s own body image: the impression of seeing one’s 
own body from alternated allocentered perspectives in relation to the somatic body. 
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OBEs in healthy persons are often related to sleep-paralysis, REM sleep (see Zippel 
2014, this volume), lucid dreaming, trance and traumatic experience. Thus OBEs 
challenge and alter our “everyday” or expected experience of the spatial and 
temporal unity of self and body and the “identity” of global self and body in its 
multimodal constitution between senses, attentional self-location, action and 
imagination.  
Autoscopic experiences in our view question: 
1) the coherence of the body as one and only and exclusively mine: the “naturally” 
assumed somatic self-“identification” (i.e. the degree(!) to which humans identify 
with their own bodies: “What I experience as my body” (Blanke and Metzinger 
2009)” 
2) the stability and “permanence” (Merleau Ponty) of my self-experience (visual or 
proprioceptive feeling or vestibular) in relation to my body and to self-location (i.e., 
the volume in space: “Where I experience to be”) 
3) the relation between my experiential point of view of my self and the point of 
view of the somatic body: first-person perspective ( i.e. , the directedness of 
conscious experience: “From which vantage point I experience the world”) 
Autoscopic experiences can help elucidate body ownership3. According to Tsakiris 
(2011) body ownership “gives somatosensory signals a special phenomenal quality, 
and it is fundamental to self-consciousness: the relation between my body and “me” 
differs from both the relation between my body and other people’s bodies and the 
relation between external objects and me” (Tsakiri 2011, 181).  
We argue that on the one hand we can partly describe autoscopic experiences such 
as OBE or heautoscopy as cinematic experiences of a body without a screen. On the 
other hand we can observe that the viewer’s film experience in a movie theater 
resembles an extended sense of “out-of body” experience that diverges in the sense of 
being more of an extended “inside-of-the-other-(body)-experience” What 
differences do we feel when the subjective perspective puts us in the situation of 
emphatizing with the murderer, someone of another sex etc.? Could we actuallz put 
this switch of perspective to test with neuroscientific methods? 
What we want to draw attention on by describing film experience as an out-of-body 
experience is something detectable as well in an experiment by Slater et al (2009), 
which shows strong evidence for the plasticity of the body image. Hereby male 
participants in a virtual reality situation even perceived the avatar of a young girl 
as their own body (Slater et al 2009). This brings us up to the point that these drifts 
of perceptions, imaginations and affects of the perspective spatially and 
psychologically are important to be studied by sitations of cinematic experience 
including 2D cinema, 3D virtual reality and avatar studies that will help us to 
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understand the drifting attribution of a certain body image to me or to another 
person or character depending on the perspective we are taking on or shifting away 
from. In the analysis of film experience including virtual reality and avatar studies, 
nonetheless we have to stay conscious about the fact that such experiences imply 
completely different positions of the viewer and this is crucial as we talk of 
dynamics of perspective taking, besides attentional self-locations (SL). The very 
goal of our proposal is to problematize some relevant aspects of our behavior 
during film watching, when we are challenged to move ourselves to a virtual 
environment populated by virtual agents with whom we can interact through the 
peculiar behavior of the camera.  
Why OBEs could be interesting to be treated as cinematic experience in itself and 
why OBEs can be called "cinematic experience without a screen"? We need to ask 
further: why we not only have a) a sense of self-agency, the “prereflective 
experience that I am the one who is causing or generating a movement or action or 
thought” (Gallagher 2012) b) a sense of “self-ownership” the pre-reflexive 
experience that I am the one who experiences, but also the c) Perspective switches, 
the possibility to consciously or mostly prereflectivly switch perspectives in relation 
to the body-location and different extension levels of embodiment and its relation 
to others: my body, the other body on the screen and the film as body, the general 
body of the cinematic experience (that can have interbodily components) and then 
come back to our core body self after the screen is dark again and the lights are 
switched on.  
How can we temporarily identify and lose ourselves/ our feeling of embodiment in 
an absorbing or immersive experience and then come back to a self-localisation of 
our own core body? These questions bring us to the topic of perspective taking. 
2.2 Perspective –Taking 
For Thomas Fuchs (2012, 2013) every encounter is based on the capacity to switch 
between your own embodied perspective and the perspective of the other and at 
the same time to distinguish both perspectives that is to assert yourself in front of 
the other. Hereby Fuchs (2013) quotes an interesting point of Blankenburg that we 
will take up here: That is, one has to able to integrate the egocentric and the 
allocentric perspective without loosing one´s own bodily center permanently.  
 
“Or as Blankenburg 1965 says this to the point: Every taking over of perspective 
implies already a potential self-loss that however is suspended in its status 
nascendi.” (Fuchs 2012b).  
According to Fuchs schizophrenia is best analysed as the alienation of its own body 
or as a "disembodiment" (Stanghellini 2004, Fox 2005, Fuchs and Schlimme 2009). 
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This refers to the concepts embodied subjectivity (Embodiment), as currently used 
in the cognitive sciences (Varela et al. 1991, Gallagher 2005, Thompson 2007, Fuchs 
2012c). Disturbances of embodiment may be classified according to Fuchs & 
Schlimme in two fundamental categories:“(1) as primarily affecting the subject 
body or prereflective embodied sense of self; such is the case, for example, in 
schizophrenia or depression, or (2) as being more related to the bodyimage or 
explicit body awareness. These include, for example, body dysmorphic disorder, 
hypochondriasis, somatoform disorders or eating disorders such as anorexia 
nervosa” Fuchs & Schlimme 2009, 571, and we could add the second type is 
important in cinematic experience. 
Schizophrenia thus includes, according to Fuchs & Schlimme the weakening of the 
basic sense of self. This means a disruption of implicit bodily functioning and a 
disconnection from the intercorporality with others: “As a result of this 
disembodiment, the prereflective, practical immersion of the self in the world is 
lost” (Fuchs & Schlimme 2009). We could call this the natural media immersion of the 
bodily self in the world in difference to artificial technologically induced immersion 
as by cinematic experience or virtual reality environments. For Fuchs there is a 
foundational role of second person interactions for the development of social 
perspectives (Fuchs 2012). He argues that embodied second person interactions are 
not only an enabling, but also the constitutive condition for the development of an 
explicit first and third person perspective. This elevates the possibility of OBE´s and 
different kinds of perspectives and perspective taking to fundamental importance 
not only in social cognition but as well in the proper idea of a cinematic self and its 
technologically mediated existence, one of it foundational part is the switch of 
perspective. 
Perspective taking is a developed “natural” technology of a lived human body. Perspective 
taking can mean the embedded ability to follow the eye gaze of the other and get 
empathically entangled and experience the other´s complex perspective ( visual, 
empathic-affective, motoric etc.) and in a metaperspective describe the presentation 
of a scene, object, event or atmosphere from different situated vantage points in the 
world. This ability of perspective and orientation isdeeplz related to the possibility 
of switch of perspective and involving the attention to another self or ourself from 
another point of view, but does persepctive always imply the feeling of being 
grounded in a somatic body?  
A) Perspective taking involves the perspective from x such as a situated subjective 
either extended spatio- (somato) corporal self location or a virtual or imagined 
selflocation as in autoscopic experiences and B) the perspective/ angle towards y, 
for instance the objectifying one’s own view of the object, and anticipating that 
moving to another situated vantage point. C) These changes of vantage points can 
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result in specific changes in presentation of an event, object, scene or atmosphere, 
such as a feeling towards someone, one´s own body-image, or self-concept. D) The 
differentiation and self/other coordination of viewpoints is an important feature of 
multiple perspective-takings as well as E) the constancy/stability/permanancy of 
perspectives towards a scene/atmosphere/object event or world during taking on a 
perspective and accordingly the point of view of the self. We can as well distinguish 
perspective-taking in the following modalities: 
a) Spontaneous, involuntary or effordless Perspective-Taking (without volition or 
intention of taking on the perspective of oneself, the you or the other), and that is 
what Fuchs (2012b) calls implicit 1PP, 2PP or 3PP and we can also call transparent 
perspectives for the one taking on the corresponding perspective. For example 
spontaneously feeling oneself in someone else´s shoes, but also effordless 
attentional switches between the 2nd, 1st and 3rd PP. 
b) Non-spontaneous, voluntary, effordfull, self-conscious or explicit (Fuchs 2012b) 
perspective taking (1PP, 2PP and 3PP) goes far beyond the feeling of empathy; it 
involves for example active effordful figuring out what others feel, perceive and 
think.  The effordful acquisition of a perspective – as in an actors work on a role) is 
based on on many of the brains executive functions. It may require inhibitory 
control over our thought and feelings to consider the perspectives of others, and 
thus in a metacognitive reflection to consider the possibility of someone else besides 
our own thinking, cognitive flexibility to be able to see and interpret a situation in 
different ways can be seen. 
 
OBE and other forms of autoscopic experiences are first of all unorthodox forms of 
spectatorship and they entail different forms of immersion which have to be 
researched on and considered within a dialectic between alienation (of self from 
own body, loss of somatic self) and appropriation (of avatar body among other 
possibilities), according – for instance – to Ganesh and colleague’s works on the 
human brain and the virtual (2011).  
Hereby we can refer to cinematic experiences as immersive stretegies in modulating 
and enhancing the possibility of taking on involuntarily and later also reflectively 
the perspective of a certain “fictional” point of view of the other.  
2.3 OBE, the self and cinematic experience 
So far we have been wondering whether it would be possible to compare OBEs to a 
sort of cinematic experience without a screen and to detect something similar to 
OBEs in traditional cinematic experience, by mainly focusing on the dialectic 
between different forms of perspective taking. As we have demonstrated so far, 
OBEs could be thought of as a weird form of spectatorship, which implies a 
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dissociation of the viewer from her own doubled (visible and somatic) body and the 
observation of it from an imaginary location in the extracorporeal space. Alienation 
and self-loss are constitutive elements of an experience that we would describe as 
an illusory, phantasmagoric and fictious experience. The body is bilocated and we 
see our own body from another dimension and position, and although this position 
is an illusory one, we experience our illusory second body as our own body and our 
real body as an image of it. This is the reason why OBE represents a very particular 
type of immersion of the self: the OBEer is immersed in an imaginary space, 
perceived within an illusory sensory-motor perspective, responding to very 
particular stimuli, which holds as well for cinematic experience in general.  
If a non-OBEer should try to imagine an OBE, he or she would inevitably end up to 
refer to his or her experiences as spectator, he or she would imagine of occupying 
an impossible position, usually above the real body, and they should imagine an 
absurd point-of-view moving freely inside their room, and perhaps flying out of the 
window, and finally coming back to rejoin the real body. In short, they would 
imagine a cinematic experience: the camera is able to place us in unfamiliar 
positions, it can provide us an absurd point-of-view, it can wander across our room, 
and – as every moviegoer knows – it can make us fly with the means of the film’s 
body. Moreover, film editing is able to regulate our attention, to elicit our emotion, 
to link very different places and environments in perfect continuity and 
transparency, and then – at the end of the movie – to allow us to re-enter our somatic 
body, we had forgotten about. 
At the very beginning of cinema, when film theory was more a physiological matter 
than a cultural one, we find several writings in which film experience is described 
as an alteration of the human self, or as a loss of self-location and self-identification. 
We could recall here many writings from the first years of film history, to emphasize 
the sensorial novelty displayed by the movies and to demonstrate how impressive 
the new experience was from an affective point of view. Let us quote just two 
exemplar passages written in 1896 and 1919 by Maksim Gorki and Urban Gad 
respectively. Gorki offers a disturbing description of film experience:  
“Cette vie grise et silencieuse finit par vous troubler et vous oppresser, vous avez 
l’impression qu’elle contient comme un avertissement, dont la signification vous 
échappe, mais qui est lugubre, et étreint votre cœur d’angoisse. Vous oubliez peu à 
peu où vous êtes, d’étranges images surgissent dans votre tête, votre conscience 
semble s’obscurcir, se perturber…” (Gorki 1896).  
Gad’s description of film experience is quite surprising and provides elements that 
make the comparison with the OBE’s spectatorship even easier: “Les hommes dans 
leur grande masse naïve doivent se retrouver dans le film comme dans un miroir – 
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un miroir, il est vrai, suspendu en hauteur et qui contraint à lever les yeux.” (Gad 
1919). 
The alteration of the viewer’s self seems to be implied in these first descriptions of 
cinematic experience. On the one hand, Gorki talks of the distress of such an 
oppressive experience, emphasizing the alteration and perturbation of the viewer’s 
consciousness, while on the other Gad describes the screen as a mirror placed above 
the viewer and capable to double her position and to put herself in a totally new 
dimension.  
At the beginning of 20th century it is a common and widely shared idea that film 
experience should have been conceived as an altered state of consciousness, 
something between daydreams and a mysterious form of hypnosis. There is a very 
telling short story, published in 1907 by the popular Italian writer Edmondo De 
Amicis, through which we can perfectly grasp such a feeling about cinema. It is the 
story of a middle class Italian man, alone in his house since his wife and daughters 
went to theater. He sits on an armchair and thinks of his life. Gradually he starts 
having a weird sensation, like one who leaves his own body and floats through the 
room, and then along hills, mountains and valleys. Suddenly he thinks of a 
newsagent and he sees him quite clearly, and what is more interesting and scaring 
he feels the newsagent as a secondary self, having the impression that the 
newsagent’s face has overlapped his own. If we should find a term to describe, 
nowadays, the experience narrated by De Amicis, maybe we would choose OBE. 
Nonetheless, in 1907, De Amicis chose another term: cinema. The title of the story 
is “Cinematografo cerebrale” (“cerebral cinema”), in which film experience and the 
brain are connected to emphasize the alteration of human cognition at the movies. 
Although someone might sell off these judgments as naives and too strongly 
connected to a not yet well developed idea of film experience, it is a matter of fact 
that the relationship between the movie and the human mind is at the heart of what 
is considered to be one of the most insightful book of early film theory: Hugo 
Münsterberg’s 1916 The Photoplay: A Psychological Study (2002). This distinguished 
Harvard psychologist – who moved from Germany to Massachussets at the end of 
XIX century on the invitation of William James – noticed that cinema could not be 
understood without referring to the effect it has on our brain-body system. Cinema, 
in other words, externalizes our affective-cognitive processes, feelings, emotions, 
and even motor behavior, by means of stylistic techniques and innovative narrative 
solutions: a flashback would be a kind of externalization/representation of memory, 
while a close-up would be the same for attention. Münsterberg’s book, as we can 
read it nowadays, would represent the most clear reflection of a common and 
shared feelings about modernity as a form of intensification of the nervous 
stimulation, resulting from the swift and uninterrupted change of outer and inner 
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stimuli, to borrow Georg Simmel’s description of the new metropolis at the very 
beginning of XX century. According to scholars like Ben Singer (1995), or more 
recently Christof Türcke (2002), film culture would be part of a new form of 
modernism based on the hyperstimulus and on a new form of affective interaction, 
and it would precisely grounded on a “neurological conception of modernity”, as 
Singer calls it, including the distraction from one´s own somatic body. In other words, 
there is a new form of self-technique capable of shaping up our imaginary by 
affecting our mind and body and by challenging the viewer’s spatio-temporal 
cognition in a totally new and impressive manner. Recalling the idea by Daney 
about the dialectic between two spaces and two kinds of vision – basically the same 
form of dialectic suggested by Feldmann and by two film phenomenologists like 
Sobchack and Voss –, we could observe how it is the film style which pursues and 
at the same time regulate this spatial negotiation, and how our multilayered and 
multimodal film cognition depends on the success of such a negotiation. 
To better understand such a story, we should get back to the long neglected season 
of film-physiology, that is a period – from the beginning of 20th century to the 1920s 
– during which many physician start working on film in order to evaluate the 
impact of the new medium on the human brain (Guerra 2013) and cognitive make-
up such as the “attentional self” (Gerner upcoming). Both in Europe and in US we 
have important studies on this way, like those of the French physician Edouard 
Toulouse, who, for instance, was convinced that the impression of reality largely 
depended on the viewer’s motor simulation of the events depicted on the screen – 
some passages in Toulouse’s works seem to anticipate the research on embodied 
simulation promoted after the discovery of mirror neurons (Toulouse 2010; Gallese 
and Guerra 2012) and its empathy in relation to a film character or a virtual object 
(Fuchs 2014). 
Among physicans, we could mention the case of the Italian neuropsychiatrist 
Giuseppe D’Abundo, who wrote a paper in 1911 entitled “Sopra alcuni particolari 
effetti delle projezioni cinematografiche sui nevrotici” (Concerning the effect of film 
viewing on neurotic individuals). His idea was that a movie can determine states of 
psychic instability in patients like neurotics, hysterics, or paranoids. According to 
him, the responsible of this state is not the film plot, but “the rapid and vibratory 
movement of the cinematic action” (D’Abundo 1911: 434), which is able to transport 
the viewer in another dimension, giving him the impression to be at the same time 
here and there. He concludes saying that film projections should be considered 
dangerous for many categories of subjects. 
To us it is important to rethink such an experimental background, since we know 
how crucial it has been for film theories like those proposed by Sergej Eisenstein 
(we know today how close to Aleksandr Lurija he was) in the 1920s and 1930s – 
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think of his idea of film editing as a form of “ek-stasis” – or by Walter Benjamin in 
the 1930s.  An affective and sensory approach to film experience was also implied 
in Antonin Artaud’s few writings on film, where he said that cinema “acts directly 
on the grey matter of the brain” (Artaud 1972, 166). It is not by accident if, in the 
1950s, the new school of French filmology will restart from here, trying to shape up 
a field of research on film where psychology and anthropology would converge.  
In 1956, the German philosopher Erich Feldmann wrote a brilliant article on the 
“Revue Internationale de Filmologie”, in which he claimed that film experience 
basically depends on the viewer’s ability to move from a real environment – that 
she occupies in the dark movie theater – to an imaginary dimension – that provided 
by the world depicted on the screen –, feeling herself localized outside her body. 
Feldmann stresses that such an experience, during film watching, is elicited without 
what he calls “modifications psycho-physiologiques”. These are his words: “Le film 
réclame du spectateur ce qui semble à première vue impossible : se transporter, sans 
l’aide d’excitants, de stupéfiants, ni de modifications psycho-physiologiques 
engendrées par la seule projection lumineuse, dans une situation irréelle, tout en 
demeurant dans la situation réelle de la salle un être éveillé qui croit à la réalité du 
film qui l’absorbe.” (Feldmann 1956, 84). After few lines, he adds that “l’individu 
voit surgir dans le cadre de sa vie une combinaison de conditions qui modifient son 
attitude habituelle et qui demandent une accomodation.” Feldmann seems to 
suggest that this “accomodation” would need a kind of ability that the viewer 
should have in order to enjoy the movie. His assumption implies not only a change 
of perspective and a doubling of the viewer’s presence-to-a-world, but also an 
alteration of the viewer’s consciousness, as if she would need a cinematic 
consciousness provided by film techniques to enter the fictitious world of film. 
Without entering a debate on what we mean when we talk of cinematic 
consciousness (see Morin 2005, who was strongly influenced and inspired by 
French filmologists, Pepperell and Punt 2006, McGinn 2005), we could borrow Serge 
Daney’s theory (1993) of film viewing and describe it as a form of alternation 
between a “vision bloquée” (meaning body centered, situated), and a “vision 
liberée” (meaning disembodied, experienced in an extrapersonal space).  
We could as well recall some of the theories according to which cinema implies an 
alteration of the self based on a doubled spectator capable of living simultaneously 
in two different environments- inside a world which is unreal or all too hyperreal. 
Such positions are still widely shared if we think of how contemporary film 
phenomenology basically oscillates between the idea that the reciprocity between 
the viewer and the screen would originate a strange subject to be denominated 
“cinesthetic subject” (Sobchack 1992), and the idea that the viewer’s body, 
resonating with the events on screen, would loan a three-dimensional body to the 
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screen, making the viewer nothing less than a “surrogate body” for the screen (Voss 
2011), an idea amplified by the independence view of a doubled self, or artificial 
extention of “secondary persons”(Bainbridge 2014).  
Also, more recent theories of cinematic subjectivity (Chateau 2011) seem to wonder 
how and whether the movie can be endowed with subjectivity, at least a simulated 
ot enacted form of intersubjectivity assured by the degree of immersion and self-
loss of the viewer into the movie and its “extended empathy”4 (Fuchs 2014) and 
immersion towards the characters represented on the screen (without their real 
bodies being present).  
ȡ 
For instance seeing Pedro Costa´s film “Juventude em Marcha” for the first time in 
the movie theatre in Lisbon and noting a switch/twist or crack in the way of 
perceiving while empathetically taking on perspective and feeling inside the shoes 
of the main character Ventura getting disoriented in a fragil world of his cultural 
survival. The anti-hero Ventura that already lost the one he loved and is disoriented 
in the cleanness of social housing that have windows and doors that close but don´t 
let the common life or the community occur, shows what could be formulated with 
Peter Handke as the loss of the open image, or as we could call it the whitening out 
of the image as a bleeching out a stain and belonging to a life world: The loss of an 
image of the world ("Der Bildverlust" Handke 2002) is as well a self loss of existential 
feeling of belonging to a fundamental self-world-image at the time of its loss. In the 
movie Colossal Youth [original: Juventude em Marcha] (2006) of Pedro Costa 
something of a life (Ventura) and culture (capverdian) is milled. This empathetic 
world-image that is installed in the viewer is proposed to open up the viewer´s self 
in the sense of an “existential feeling of being” (Ratcliffe 2008). Ventura becomes 
you and me, we are affected by him and become part of the film´s body: we become 
the one that lost a friend a woman, a life a home a culture, or simply a human 
belonging to this world. The film of Pedro Costa describes a bleaching of the image 
that simultaneously opens and makes the viewer empathetically belong to film’s 
body, a property of pain, a memory,  a march against the loss of an image and a 
body that holds, resists, that is valid. The film starts with the emptying of the 
interieur of a house by defenestration, a concrete (and political) act of ejectment of 
an old furniture (an interior- or a former self is defenestrated, through a window frame 
that never had a window in the first place, a place without the protection against 
the cold, but as well a place of social possibility of permanent openings for instance 
if there is need to call someone for help from the street or for company and the one 
who is called answering right away. In the film Ventura is obliged to accept social 
housing, all white walls and double windows, which is shown as the opposite as to 
the inicial fenestration of old furniture. The loss of viscerally felt entanglement with 
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the living by institutionalized, whitened and cleaned atmospheres that are aseptic 
and disorienting living spaces in which the doors close on their own and the 
window are double and soundproof, that no life sign can be detected by a call of a 
friend from the street: what this movie shows is a double autoscopic self-closure, a 
losing myself immersively in the character Ventura and the body of Collosal Youth, 
and the expression of a cultural self-loss in the narrative of the movie: a double 
cinematic OBE experience.  
Let us therefore explore the concept of “Cinematic experience as a temporally limited 
immersive self-loss in the other”. What could be the reason why players prefer to see 
their own avatar character entirely from an overview perspective from above (OBE 
perspective) and not from within a direct and absorbing 1st PP? How can we relate 
this back to the cinematic experience as a proto-OBE?  For this we have to have a 
look at immersive experience. 
3. Immersive experience 
It seems phenomenologically more correct to not simply equal OBEs with Avatar 
experience- as technologic self- extension of self concept in which a distance 
towards the technical virtual double can be reinstalled at any given moment. 
However, we have to ask the following question in relation to immersive 
experience: Can we be distracted from our somatic body and immersed into a fictional or 
cinematic body- the body I feel and am affected by as long as the cinematic experience lasts?  
Let’s start to tackle this question by looking back on a phenomenological account of 
the basic bodily self: The basic bodily self before having a referable 1st PP or any 
kind of self-knowledge or self-concept in relation to contents or objects is 
characterized by a (pre-predicative) bodily affective self feeling, of an immediate 
pre-reflective self-presence. The question is if this self-feeling is already attributed 
to my somatic body and if this is always a conscious, or in the sense of Thomas 
Fuchs, explicit 1PP?   
The self in this first ipseity or immanent account of radical self-affection, can also 
be described as an existential feeling of being (Ratcliffe 2008) –a self, an worldly 
awareness of being that is not already an object, an emotion or a mere disposition 
of something or itself. I feel through bodily appearing and by being affected, but this 
constant floating feeling of being makes me myself.  This does not – however- mean that 
“I” feel exceptionally from a pure 1st PP and always consciously a “what”, that is 
“my body”. This in turn means my body through which I feel and am by what I am 
somatically and physicologically affected with is already part of something else 
than me- an internal other- and thus is experienced in different ways, that is in 
Altered Self-Experiencs. Ratcliffe5 defines existential feeling therefore as a relational 
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bodily awareness in which the body is a seen as a kind of a natural medium of this 
existential feeling “through which” something is experienced. 
Therefore Irene Mittelberg (2013), when referring to bodily movements as gestures 
calls these already natural media of an “exbodied mind”.  How strong the bond 
towards this natural medium – the bodily self- is can be the degree of natural 
immersedness inside our bodies. This feeling of being affected for Fuchs is inherent 
in all conscious processes and thus is able to be differentiated into a a) primarily 
bodily self b) an ecological self and c) a social self. All of these are seen under the concept 
of ipsiety or the experience of self-affection. How can we see now the immersivenes 
inside our body being altered by cinematic experience and its different technically 
produced modes by film style and editing and the atmosphere of the cinema 
theatre? 
For a short while we start by the feeling of absorption by the cinematic dark room, 
leaving the conscious nexus with our somatic body by being affected by entering 
this cinema world. In this darkness your senses go to the light, your body is fixed 
on a seat, your bodily self is still, stillness as if being in a temporary tank of sensory 
deprevation, in which your gaze is channeled by image sound and rhythm as film 
editing and film style: your gaze onto the screen, and reducing the complexity about 
the self awareness “about” your own body by the immersion with other bodies. 
From the start of cinematic experience people wanted to see bodies like ours moving 
in space, people, animals running leaving the factory, the first kiss in film -“that´s 
how people leave the factory, that’s how people kiss”, “that’s how people walk”, 
and that´s how people escape from the train coming towards us”, the scientific 
instinct of seeing, and feeling and running with the others on the screen as a 
necessity to see ourselves (as explored in the thought provoking Elias Canetti’s 
theatre play “The comedy of vanity” (Canetti 1981) in which the only reason for a 
revolution is the sensory deprivation of seeing ourselves in other people, thus the people 
loosing themselves by not seeing themselves in the others, in their own double image 
of  a self-other; we still want to see ourselves autoscopically in arts in the movies in a 
TV showbut also to immerse our body within the other– as we have a technique of 
social perspective taking and joint intentionality (Tomasello 2014): or let´s better 
say: we constitutionally need to see ourselves in order for me to be able to form, 
maintain or alter myself. We could call this the natural media immersion of the bodily 
self in the other. This natural immersiveness of the body can be technologically 
enhanced and become an artificial technologically induced immersion by external 
media, both natural and artificial imersiveness are part of cinematic experiences 
that alter the experience of self.  
For Fuchs (2012, 2012b) there is a foundational role of second person interactions 
for the development of these immersions in the other that he calls social 
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perspectives. He argues that embodied second person interactions are not only an 
enabling, but also the constitutive condition for the development of an explicit first 
and third person perspective. Maybe cinematic experience can give us back a basic 
–almost childlike- belief in the world as if for the first time looking at the other; 
cinematic experience then would be another form of reembodied self experience 
with the other that is me on the screen:  that is what Deleuze talks about in his 
cinema books. 
When we see a bad movie, we “drop out” of the state of immersion, or bounce back 
to our seat and feel the uncomfortable position our body is squeezesd in, we start 
moving on our seat, or we look at details that are unimportant – in bad theatre we 
start noticing the lighting equipement- we let our attention stray in the image 
instead of being immersed and transported, entertained or even transformed. 
Instead of loosing our self we loose track of the narrative the plot, the character the 
situation, the film´s body, and we start thinking about something else, ruminating. 
The cinematic guidance of a psychogenic flight stops or crashes we are on land of 
our own reality instead of being in the air and out and away with the film.  
ȡ 
The cinematic phenomenon of immersion into a new cinematic body has similarity 
to the technically induced »body swap illusion« (Petkova/Ehrson 2008), in which 
manipulation of the visual perspective and correlated multisensory information 
(passive tactile information) from another person’s body is sufficient to create the 
illusion of inhabiting a non-somatic body by means of a continous match between 
visual and somatosensory information about the state or location of the new 
humanoid body and the adoption of a 1PP moving the person´s perceived center of 
awareness from the somatic body  to another artificial body. 
We can describe immersion as a voluntarily induced bodily or embodied somatic 
self-loss experience in the other – on the contrary to involuntary or pathologic self 
absorption.  This is exactly what aesthetic cinematic experience, in the large sense, 
seems about: “a new method to move a person’s perceived centre of awareness from 
one body to another”. We become part of the body of the movie, we are carried 
along by hands of narrative and the face of empathy and rhythm of editing style 
and all the characters affects, performatively presenting us with our actually 
unfolded complexity, in which by taking on the perspective of the other.  We 
discover new knowledge about us and the world by the unfolding of the characters 
on the screen that become my other self, the story relates to my life, myself and 
other ыs around me: in a cinematic experience the you – I-here relation: the somatic 
body, the body of the characters and the film ыs body, as well as the narrative, mingle 
into a complex technically induced and experiementally felt cinematic self and with 
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the next illusionary continuity shot we don ыt cut out parts of our body or our 
position in space or change our point of view etc., but we might drift or switch into 
the film, by shortening the loops between the filmic double of my body and the 
body that is the cinematic experience of the film. As Becchio et al put it: 
“perspective-taking entails an altercentric remapping of space, i.e. remapping of 
objects and locations coded with reference to the other person’s body“ (Becchio et 
al 2011). 
 But: can we become a cinematic self who’s self-location can be temporarily be shifted out of 
its body? The notion of a cinematic -self and its possible mode OBE looking back on 
us, is still to be discovered: the screen becoming my virtual body, then looking back 
onto myself, might be described as a “proto” heautoscopy in cinematic experience. 
The magic latern lights up on the skin of my body- still a metaphoric way of 
speaking- but, maybe in the future, this might change and become reality.  
Experiences as the bodyswapping art/gender project of “The Machine of Being 
another” hints into this direction by the direct swap of female/male bodies and the 
looking back onto my body from the viewpoint outside of myself. To avoid nausea 
the gender pairs are asked to choreograph their movements while looking onto 
themselves from another outside body of the other. 
screenshots (p/w) from:  http://www.themachinetobeanother.org/?p=1062 
 
Getting lost, drawn into or involved in a plot, a narrative, a character a feature of a 
body or even a full body, our filmic-somatic loop becomes alive.  Does being dragged 
into a movie or being absorbed by a virtual cinematic experience mean that I loose myself? 
The lights would never turn back on again exactly the same way as time passes in 
Through the use of Oculus Rift headsets, and first-person cameras, the Gender Swap 
experiment creates a visual-perceptive enhancement that partner A can see what is being 
recorded by the visor worn by partner B, and vice versa. A technically mediated cinematic 
Out-of-Body Experience created by Barcelona-based artists BeAnotherLab, in which both 
are asked to coordinate their body movements. 
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the screening room, or in my visual field. What if this temporary self-loss experience 
in an extreme situation would never stop? Blankenburg describes the self-loss in 
the other in the case of schizophrenia, and that we are always in general already in 
a state of self-loss by being with the other- and we can add by being in the movie 
with each other- however: we can suspend this self-loss in the other by going out of 
the movie or taking off the VR googles, a fact that schizophrenia patients in their 
condition can’t, they are stuck to their episodic hallucination for the time being. We 
usually can suspend this self-loss in its status nascendi and reassure that my somatic 
body is mine and your somatic body is yours. What if our imaginative flight does 
not land in the same place again? A question has to be answered: Is our bodily self 
the same/ identical after having had a cinematic experience?  
Two other fundamental questions arise at the very beginning of this work in 
progress: 
1) How can we provide empirical data in order to test the plausibility of these proposals with 
respect to theories of the self and film phenomenology, and technically enhanced cinematic 
experience and virtual immersion?   
2) Would this approach be the right one in order to disentangle the complex articulation of 
the embodied, disembodied, and re-embodied relation to cinema and, more generally, visual 
media in an immersed cinematic self? 
1  Research of Alexander Gerner is supported by a FCT Post-Doc grant: SFRH/BPD/90360/2012  
2  According to Blanke et al (2008) we can distinguish several forms of autoscopic phenomena 
or illusiory doubles of a bodily self, visual, auditory the sensomotor. He also includes 
negative heautoscopy, the impossibility to see onself when looked up directly in the mirrow 
(see: Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935) also called negative doubles, but we will not include 
these phenomena in this paper.  
3  Bolognini et al (2011) report the third long-lasting case of autoscopy in a patient with right 
occipital lesion in their study “Spatial perspective and Coordinate Systems in autoscopy. A 
Case Report of a “Fantome de Profil” in Occipital Brain Damage”. Instead of the commonly 
reported frontal mirror view (fanto  me spéculaire), the patient saw her head and upper trunkࡂ
laterally in side view (fanto  me de profil). The autoscopic image changes in relation toࡂ
movement of the body. While the body is still just the perfile of the face and the upper trunck 
are visible, in arm movements also the arm gets visible and in full movement (walking) all 
correspective body parts get visible in the autoscopic image. This is important for the fact 
that autoscopy may come in degree and thus we should as well consider immersive degrees 
of embodiment in one´s own or another body. 
4  Empathy towards the “virtual other” in Fuchs account is seen as captured “notions of (1) 
phantomization as a media-based simulation of direct reality which undermines the as-if-
consciousness, and (2) disembodied communication which shifts the modes of empathy towards the 
fictional pole at the risk of merely projecting one’s own feelings onto the other.”(Fuchs 2014)  
 Endnotes 
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5  “I argue that most, if not all, bodily feelings are relational- they are seldom, if ever, directed 
exclusively at the body. Indeed, there are “bodily feelings” that do not involve the body as 
an object of experience at all. Instead the body manifests itself as that through which 
something else is experienced.”(Ratcliffe 2012, 38)  
 
References 
Artaud, A. (1972). Collected Works. Volume 
Three. Paule Thévenin (ed.). London: Calder 
and Boyars  
Barker, J. (2009). The Tactile Eye.Touch and the 
Cineamtic Experience. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press 
Bainbridge, W. (2014). “Identity Expansion 
and Transcendence”. In: F. Bataglia and A. 
Carnevale (Eds.). Reframing the Debate on 
Human Enhancement. Humana.Mente 26, 117-
140  
Becchio, C. et al. (2011). “In your place: 
neuropsychological evidence for altercentric 
remapping in embodied perspective-taking”. 
SCAN, doi: 10.1093/scan/nsr083 
Blanke, O., Metzinger, T. (2009). „Full-body 
illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood.“ 
Trends in Cognitive Science 13, 7-13 
Boellstorff, T. (2011). “Virtuality. Placing the 
Virtual Body: Avatar, Chora, Cypherg.” In: F. 
Mescia-Lees. (Ed.). A Companion to the 
Anthropology of the Body and Embodiment. 
Hoboken NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 504-520 
Canetti, E. (1981). The Comedy of Vanity. PAJ 
playscripts: New York 
Chateau, D. (ed.) (2011). Subjectivity: Filmic 
Representation and the Spectator’s Experience. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 
D’Abundo, G. (1911), “Sopra alcuni 
particolari effetti delle projezioni 
cinematografiche nei nevrotici”, Rivista 
Italiana di Neuropatologia, Psichiatria ed 
Elettroterapia 10 
Daney, S. (1993). L’exercice a été profitable, 
Monsieur. Paris : POL 
De Amicis, E. (1995). Cinematografo cerebrale. 
Roma: Salerno Editrice 
Dor-Ziderman, Y., et al (2013) “Mindfulness-
induced selflessness: a MEG 
neurophenomenological study.” Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience 24, doi: 
10.3389/fnhum.2013.00582 
Feldmann, E. (1956), “Considérations sur la 
situation du spectateur au cinéma”, Revue 
Internationale de Filmologie, 26  
Fuchs, T. (2014). “The Virtual Other.  
Empathy in the Age of Virtuality.” Journal of 
Consciousness Studies 21 (5-6), 152-173 
___ (2012). “Selbst und Schizophrenie”. 
DZPhil 60 (6), 887-901 
___ (2012b). “The phenomenology and 
development of social perspectives” Phenom 
Cogn Sci (online-first). DOI 10.1007/s11097-
012-9267-x 
___, Schlimme, J. (2009). „Embodiment and 
psychopathology: a phenomenological 
perspective“. Current Opinion in Psychiatry 22, 
570–575  
Furlanetto, T. et al (2013). “The bilocated 
mind: new perspectives on self-localization 
and self-identification.” Frontiers of Human 
Neuroscience 7, 71 
Gad, U. (2008 [1919]). Un miroir qui contraint à 
lever les yeux. In: D. Banda & J. Moure (eds.), 
Le cinéma naissance d’un art. Paris: 
Flammarion, 416-18 
Gallagher, S. (2012). Phenomenology. 
Hampshire: Pellgrave Macmillan 
Gallese, V., Guerra, M. (2012). “Embodying 
Movies: Embodied Simulation and Film 
Studies”, Cinema: Journal of Philosophy and the 
Moving Image 3 
Ganesh, S., et al (2011). “How the Human 
Brain Goes Virtual: Distinct Cortical Regions 
of the Person-Processing Network Are 
Involved in Self-Identification with Virtual 
Agents”, Cerebral Cortex Sept. 2011; doi: 
10.1093/cercor/bhr227 
Alexander Gerner & Michele Guerra 
106 
Gardner, M. et al (2013). “Strategy modulates 
spatial perspective taking: evidence for 
dissociable embodied and disembodied 
routes.”  Front. Hum. Neurosci.13 August 
2013 ;  doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00457 
Gerner, A (forthcoming, 2014). ”Conceptual 
Personae of the “attentional self””. In: J. 
Fonseca, J. Gonçalves (eds.). "Philosophical 
Perspectives on the Self", Frankfurt, New York: 
Peter Lang, 198-233 
Gorki, M. (2008{1896}), “Au royaume des 
ombres”, in D. Banda et J. Moure (eds.), Le 
cinéma naissance d’un art. Paris : Flammarion, 
48-52 
Guerra, M. (2013), “Film-Physiology”, pH. 3 
Handke, P. (2002). Der Bildverlust oder Durch 
die Sierra des Gredos. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp  
Husserl, E. (2006). Phantasy, Image 
Consciousness and Memory (1898-1925). Trans. 
John B. Brough. (=Husserliana: Edmund 
Husserl - Collected Works; Book 11) 
Dordrecht: Springer 
Ihde, D. (2002). Bodies in Technology. 
Mineapolis: University of Minnesota 
___ (2010). Embodied Technics. Automatic 
Press / VIP 
Maguire, E. et al (1998). “Knowing where and 
getting there. A Human Navigation 
Network.” Report, Science 280, 921-924 
McGinn, C. (2005). The Power of Movies: How 
Screen and Mind Interact. New York: Pantheon 
Books 
Mittelberg, I. (2013). “The Exbodied Mind: 
Cognitive-Semiotic Principles as Motivating 
Forces in Gesture.” In: C. Müller, et al (Eds.) 
(2013). Body – Language – Communication: An 
International Handbook on Multimodality in 
Human Interaction. Handbooks of Linguistics 
and Communication Science (38.1). Berlin, 
New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 750-779 
Menninger-Lerchenthal, E. (1946). Der eigene 
Doppelgänger. Bern 
Morin, E. (2005), The Cinema, or the Imaginary 
Man, Minnesota University Press, 
Minneapolis  
Münsterberg, H. (2002), Hugo Münsterberg on 
Film: The Photoplay: a Psychological Study and 
Other Writings. Allan Langdale (ed.).  New 
York: Routledge 
Murch, W. (2001). In the Blinck of an Eye. 2nd 
rev. edition. Los Angeles: Silman-James Press 
Pepperell, R., Punt, M. (eds) (2006), Screen 
Consciousness: Cinema, Mind and World, 
Rodopi, Amsterdam-New York 
Petkova, V., Ehrsson, H. (2008). “If I Were 
You: Perceptual Illusion of Body Swapping.” 
PLoS ONE 3(12), e3832,  
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003832 
Ratcliffe, M. (2008). Feelings of Being. 
Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of 
Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
___ (2012). “The Phenomenology of 
Existential Feeling”. In: J. Fingerhut, S. 
Marienberg (Eds.) The Feeling of Being Alive. 
Berlin: de Gruyter, 23-54 
Singer, B. (1995). “Modernity, 
Hyperstimulus, and the Rise of Popular 
Sensationalism”. In: Cinema and the Invention 
of Modern Life. L. Charney & V. Schwartz 
(eds.). Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press 
Sobchack, V. (1992), The Address of the Eye: A 
Phenomenology of Film Experience. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press  
Slater, M. et al (2009). “Inducing Illusory 
Ownership of a Virtual Body.” Frontiers in 
Neuroscience 3, 214–220 
Tomasello, M. (2014). A Natural History of 
Human Thinking. Harvard: Harvard 
University Press 
Türcke, C. (2002). Erregte Gesellschaft. 
Philosophie der Sensation. München: C.H.Beck 
Tversky, B., Hard, B. (2009). “Embodied and 
Disembodied Cognition. Spatial Perspective 
Taking”. Cognition 110, 124-199 
Voss, C. (2011), “Film Experience and the 
Formation of Illusion: the Spectator as 
“Surrogate Body” for the Cinema”, Cinema 
Journal, 50 (4)
 
View publication stats
